Abstract: Non-state actors contribute with inputs to the elaboration of the national interest in trade negotiations, thus enhancing its legitimacy. Nevertheless, does the participation of those actors necessarily equal influence on the part of all segments of civil society on policymaking? To answer the question, I argue that procedural legitimacy should be evaluated not only in relation to the inputs society provides to the State, but should also consider whether officials actually analyse societal contributions in decision-making. I demonstrate the empirical application of the model based upon Brazil's experience in multilateral trade negotiations during the 2000s, using Mexico as a shadow case. I conclude that foreign trade policymaking can only be democratised if, in procedural legitimacy, the State attributes equal weight to contributions from all types of societal actors, including civil society organisations and organised social movements, which tend to have less material resources and power than interest groups such as business associations and labour unions.
Introduction
The participation of non-state actors in policymaking has attracted the attention of various fields of Social Sciences, including Foreign Policy Analysis and Normative Theory. Specifically, in decisions regarding international affairs -a sphere in which strategic state interests are more frequently at odds with societal demands -the effects of such a phenomenon remain unclear. The basic consensus is that non-state participation renders foreign policy subject to the logic of any other public policy in democracies, in the terms defined by Lentner (2006) , thus requiring legitimacy from societal actors. According to Barnard (2002) , legitimacy in policymaking in pluralist 2 settings should be understood in terms of procedure and substance. The former relates to legitimate decision-making (elaboration of positions), whereas the latter is associated with how well society welcomes the consequences of the positions the State takes. The definitions, however, miss a crucial point: participation, with inputs that support policymaking, do not necessarily render influence on decision-makers (Martin 2000) , who may receive demands just to mitigate the eventual contestation of policies.
Thus, if procedural legitimacy is the only one that matters before the output of policymaking emerges, how is it possible to evaluate whether all inputs are considered and, thus, influence the formation of the national interest in an issue-area? Based on the literature on State-society relations regarding transnational affairs and normative debates on legitimacy and societal participation in policymaking, I argue that, in order to elucidate that question, procedural legitimacy should be reconceptualised. Such a concept must focus not only on the degree of State openness to inputs from civil society. Rather, the consideration of those inputs is a necessary condition to confer legitimacy to decision-making, concisely defined as the set routines through which individuals acting on behalf of the State attribute final shape to outputs, including public policy targeting either domestic or international issues. If existent, such consideration takes place at the analytical stage of policymaking, henceforth considered as the phase in which officials decide the positions they will take on behalf of the State.
I demonstrate the empirical application of decomposing procedural legitimacy into an input stage and an analytical one through an empirical narrative that, following the model of Beach and Pedersen (2013: 17) , involves process tracing with the purpose of theory building. The narrative comprehends, first, a main case in which the State, in spite of having received inputs from civil society organisations (CSOs) and organised social movements (OSMs), did not take into account their positions in decision-making.
Secondly, I enhance the conclusions of the article through the study of a shadow case (Gerring 2016 ) that would represent the main case's counterfactual (Lebow 2010) , in which policymakers remained closed to demands from CSOs and OSMs. I consider CSOs as organisations that advocate issues on behalf of individuals and other collective actors without an explicit mandate from those vindicated. OSMs do the same, although are networks of CSOs, with the eventual contribution of interest groups. In turn, interest groups advocate issues for a defined constituency (Baur 2011; Smith 2008) . That is the case of business associations and labour unions. The research design reflects those theoretical concerns and empirical limitations. I have focussed the discussion on trade negotiations because it is an issue-area critical for testing the effects of procedural and substantial legitimacy. Such negotiations fall in the realm of foreign trade policy, combining the State-centric notion of national interest (Krasner 1978) with tangible impacts (redistribution of material gains, following domestic liberal frameworks such as Moravcsik 1998) of decisions on non-state actors, thus generating the expectation that they will attempt to influence policymaking. I have opted to employ Mexico as Brazil's shadow case for both practical and logical reasons.
In practical terms, differences in the availability of primary sources for each case makes problematic a paired-comparison for the purposes of theory building, in the terms of George and Bennett (2005) . For the empirical part, I rely on the triangulation of archival and secondary sources (Beach and Perdersen 2013: 123-143) . While in the case of Brazil I employ 56 semi-structured interviews with policymakers and representatives from civil society (Rodrigues Vieira 2014), the same type of sources is not available for Mexico, leaving me with no other choice but to treat it as a shadow case (Gerring 2016 with the electoral reform that opened the door for de facto party competition for the Presidential office (Magaloni 2006) . Moreover, after economic liberalising, they maintained relevant historical legacies from the corporatist system that emerged in parallel with the development of the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) project between 1930s-1980s (Schneider 1997) . At the international level, the two cases also share similarities. They are located in the same region of the world (Latin America) having gone through a process of regional integration that, in spite of differences in scope (The Common Market of the South-MERCOSUR-aims to be a customs union, while the North American Free Trade Agreement-NAFTA-is just a free-trade area), mobilised domestic actors and changed domestic preferences. By focusing only on the timeframe of the DDA negotiations, I remain faithful to the research design described above. That is the case, as the inclusion of negotiations in which the countries under scrutiny did not participate simultaneously could generate noises that would invalidate the elaboration of the empirical narrative.
The article begins with a review of the literature on State-society relations in foreign trade policy, including the debates focused on the action of CSOs and OSMs in intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in trade. The limitations of such debates support the need to study the behaviour of collective actors at the domestic level vis-à-vis the State. To fill the gaps identified in the literature review, I discuss normative concepts related to policymaking, leading me to argue for the inclusion of the analytical stage in the study of procedural legitimacy. I then develop the empirical narratives, tracing first, for the main case (Brazil), the interaction between the State and non-state actors in the 2000s regarding the DDA talks, with reference to developments in trade policymaking that had taken place during the previous decade. Subsequently, I repeat the same procedures for the shadow case (Mexico) . I conclude the article with suggestions for new avenues of research based on the re-conceptualisation of procedural legitimacy.
Non-state Actors and Trade Negotiations
The centrality of the State in elaborating positions on foreign policy has certainly been challenged by the mobilisation of non-state actors in both domestic and international arenas. Nevertheless, works that analyse the role of non-state actors in world politics still fall short of accounting for the actual weight of CSOs and OSMs in the definition of national interests in issue-areas that global governance mechanisms encompass, such as trade. That is the case, because the literature does not often make a distinction between activism (that is, the provision of inputs) and influence (the actual impact of those inputs on decision-making). As demonstrated below, particularly in works focused on Latin American cases, limitations also exist insofar as the existence of formal mechanisms of State consultation with society is usually considered a sufficient condition for societal actors to influence policymaking.
According to Risse (2002: 259) , much of the literature on civil society and international affairs contests a State-centred conception of world politics, stating that societal actors matter, yet without clarifying how they affect international issues, such as negotiations conducted within IGOs. In the realm of trade, participation of CSOs has become the rule rather than the exception. The WTO has been open to their participation at least since its first ministerial meeting, held in Singapore, in 1996 (O'Brien et al. 2000 .
Yet, activists complained about the lack of clarity in the discussions, preventing them from even participating in decision-making (O'Brien et al. 2000: 96) . counterparts. However, most of the influence of CSOs engaged in such linkages upon policymaking became effective only in issue-areas related to cases involving transborder problems, particularly in environment (Fox 2001: 253) . Such findings suggest that, at least until the early 2000s, CSOs still had the State-not mechanisms of global governance, including IGOs-as the main target for lobbying if they wanted to impact international-related issues. A brief analysis of CSO articulation for the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) corroborates the perception that transnational alliances produce activism, but not necessarily influence. Bülow (2010) reports that, in 1997, civil society groups from the Americas formed the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) during a FTAA ministerial meeting. Nevertheless, collective transnational action was not decisive in the process that led to dismantling the negotiations. Empirical studies conclude that States put the deal aside as it was no longer in the interests of governments, or, alternatively, because domestic mobilisation against the agreement mattered more (e.g. : Nelson 2015: 9) .
Both interpretations lead me to prioritise instead the domestic level in order to identify whether CSOs and OSMs influence policymaking. A group of scholars consider that democratisation automatically leads to civil society participation in policymaking. Yet, differences in the levels of participation and influence, depending on the type of policy and issue-area, are not problematised. As Batra and Otero (2007: 3) and Natal and González (2003: 854) argue in relation to the Mexican case, the corporatist system has persisted in the country even after economic liberalisation in the 1980s and democratisation in the 1990s. Thus, it seems that, for non-state actors, there is a tradeoff between autonomous organisation vis-à-vis the political establishment and the capacity to influence policymaking without being co-opted by State actors, including political parties that hold office.
Beyond Latin America, the formation of public policy has also been subject to similar debates. In that regard, the European Union (EU) emerges as a critical case due to its organisation as a multilevel system that, in centring decision-making in the hands of bureaucrats and non-elected political appointees in Brussels, mitigates the chances of civil society actors having their voice effectively heard as policies are crafted. That is why, in the European context, the literature on legitimation of public policy distinguishes output legitimacy-related to how effective a given policy is in relation to constituencies that suffer its effects-from input legitimacy-which reflects people's participation in decision-making. Such a distinction was originally devised by Scharpf (1999) for analysing communitarian/supranational policymaking. Among the scholars that attempted to advance such a discussion, there is Schmidt (2006) , who defends the need to establish consulting processes with the people. Such a debate dovetails with Barnard's (2002) notions of procedural and substantial legitimacy. As mentioned in the introduction, he argues that the former relates to the processes of rule-and decisionmaking, whereas the latter is associated with institutional output. However, in establishing such definitions, Barnard leaves aside the distinction between participation/activism and influence of societal actors in policymaking. If procedural legitimacy is the only one that matters in decision-making, how is it possible to evaluate whether all inputs are really considered in producing an output/policy?
To answer the question, Schmidt (2010: 7) proposes that policymaking should also be analysed in terms of throughput legitimacy, which focuses the processes between the input and output phases in terms of accountability, transparency (related to information availability), and openness to civil society. Yet those three elements do not assure that inputs from CSOs and OSMs will actually be considered in decision-making. As Martin (2000) argues in relation to American policymaking in foreign economic affairs, the fact that certain social actors are active even in-between the input and output stages does not mean that they are also influential. For instance, a given actor-be it an individual or a collective-may have more weight on final decisions despite not being very active during the formulation of a certain policy. Neither accountability nor transparency in decision-making suffice for conferring fairness on the entire process: they may just hide prior settlements, reached outside the realm of formal State-society interactions, such as public hearings. 8 Thus, should the State aim to elaborate policymaking in a legitimate manner, it has to be committed to analysing all contributions from civil society equally. By ignoring the principles that frame State officers' decision-making, the concept of throughput legitimacy does not distinguish between mere participation of societal actors in policymaking and their actual impact upon the outputs that result from such a process.
Within such a framework, the study of legitimacy in policymaking -including in international affairs -restricts itself to the input stage, leaving unclear whether State decisions have been set before inputs from all segments of civil society have been collected. Policymaking thus becomes nothing but a close-ended story that State-actors write alone with the eventual cooperation of a few supporters in civil society.
Unfolding Procedural Legitimacy: Input and Analytical Stages
The limitations mentioned above support the central claim of the paper: procedural legitimation needs to be re-conceptualised, conceived more than the process through which inputs are gathered from society. That is the case as existent works on non-state actors' participation in trade negotiations offer incomplete conceptual tools to verify whether a State considers de facto inputs from societal actors for subsidising decisionmaking, and then allows those contributions to change the final shape of policies.
Moreover, one has to escape the logical trap of the axiom that considers the existence of CSOs and OSMs, interested in international affairs, a sufficient condition for them to impact on policymaking in foreign-related issues. With such goals in mind, I briefly look at the concepts of justice and fairness in Normative Theory that problematize the limits for societal participation in politics outside partisan settings and elections.
At the core of those limits lies the difficulty of welcoming opposite worldviews in pluralistic settings. To mitigate such a problem, Habermas ([1983] 1990) defends a procedural conception of deliberation, which would lead participants to collective learning, including in what concerns State decisions. However, procedures-including openness to societal inputs-can have null effects upon decision-making if they do not '…include rules for evaluating and selecting competing claims and arguments…' (Renn, Webler, and Kastenholz 1996: 47) . By no means does such a claim imply that a State's decisions should be consensual: procedural justice (understood as equality in participation) tends to prevail over substantive fairness (equality in outcomes) insofar as '…various actors in society disagree about what is a just and fair solution and what ratio of payoffs and risks is regarded as acceptable' (Renn, Webler, and Kastenholz 1996: 145) . That is to say, since reaching a consensus on the substance of decisions appears to be unfeasible, opening policymaking to broad participation would be sufficient to legitimise policy outputs. In that case, all social actors would at least be equal in their ability to provide inputs, which is certainly a crucial step for legitimising States' decisions.
i Yet, if outputs in policymaking cannot be consensual due to disagreements among societal actors in what concerns their worldviews, decision-making may lack legitimation if it is structured in a functionalist fashion.
Therefore, although the substance of policy outputs hardly encompasses all standpoints from every single societal actor that contributes with inputs, the decision-making process can -and should -analyse all inputs, considering them as having equal weight.
Thus, the analytical stage in policymaking implies considering every single contribution from society as equally valuable, regardless of the individual or type of NGO providing it. By considering the existence of the analytical stage of policymaking in procedural legitimacy, one can thus assess whether the State actually mitigates asymmetries of power among civil society actors. Figure 1 outlines the difference between current approaches and the model I propose, which separates the study of procedural legitimacy into two stages (input and analytical). OSMs on the other. According to her, while interest groups strive for power, CSOs (which she labels as NGOs) do not (Baur 2011: 116) . Such a distinction dovetails with Smith's (2008) definition of social movements (which can be considered the same as OSMs). In contrast to interest groups, social movements:
[L]ack regular access to political institutions and the elites operating within those institutions. In contrast to interest groups, which are principally involved in promoting the material concerns of particular (and usually relatively privileged) groups within the existing political arrangement, social movements pursue more 'transformational' goals that alter power relations in society (Smith 2008: 199) .
While I agree that the distinction between those two types of civil society actors is useful, I argue that it has to be defined in a more precise manner, in terms of the representation of societal actors. Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, I define CSOs as organisations that act on behalf of individuals and other collective actors without having received delegation to do so, whereas OSMs follow the same logic, being, The concept of the analytical stage implies a rationale diverse from Schmidt's (2010) notion of throughput legitimacy. While the latter would depend only upon accountability, transparency, and openness to civil society-as detailed in the previous section -the forms also stem from an ethical commitment of officers in intra-State interactions as they analyse the potential policy outputs, such as different options for expressing the national interest in trade. Certainly, transparency and accountability contribute to reducing the possibility of bias in the analysis of inputs from societal actors with different levels of power, but is far from a sufficient condition for avoiding unequal weight among them in decision-making. In sum, the distinction between input and analytical stages in procedural legitimacy avoids ignoring the logical hypothesis that fairness in gathering opinions from different societal groups does not imply that the same concern is present, since the output (i.e. policy) gains its final shape through the hands of State officers responsible for decision-making.
Building the Narrative
With the distinction between the input and analytical stages within procedural at the negotiating table -Brazil, the EU, India, and the US -had agreed to include special safeguard measures (SSMs) that granted the right to States to lift temporary trade barriers to protect small farmers from import surges. This was a core demand from the CONTAG and REBRIP representatives, which suggests, at a first glance, that they managed to convert participation into influence. However, the scope of SSMs that Brazil embraced was narrower than the REBRIP had sided with, not to mention that manufacturing tariffs would have been reduced below what protectionist groups from both the market and civil society were expecting. Not, coincidently, those sectors which claimed, behind the scenes, that the deal had been 'rammed down their throats', as a member of a key interest group reports (Market Actor A 2012).
Moreover, the REBRIP acted against the liberalisation of public services, including energy and water supply, education, and health (REBRIP 2014) -issues which were eventually left aside in the negotiations, along with discussions on intellectual property.
Brazil, in fact, did not consent to discussing services not because of REBRIP's activism, but in spite of it. Evidence indicates the existence of well-articulated offensive interests in the services sector, particularly in construction and information and communication technology (ICTs) (Bureaucrat B and Bureaucrat C 2012; IBM 2006; IT Web 2007) .
Due to the lack of a unified sectorial lobbying body (like the National Confederation of Agriculture -CNA -and the CEB/CNI and FIESP in industry), the services sector, as a whole, was not be expected to have as much power as other sectors. Nevertheless, as the negotiations for the sector in the DDA were broken down into separate offers to groups of trade partners on specific issues, there was room for attending the demands of specific service-related segments. In such a scenario, one would thus expect that the Brazilian government would have been more active in the negotiation of services, expressing offensive positions on behalf of construction and ICTs.
Yet, as MDIC's officials report (Bureaucrat B and Bureaucrat C 2012) State actors and experts -working groups devoted to aspects of specific sectors and issues on which the deal would impact (Alba and Vega 2002: 67) .
The COECE participated in the NAFTA negotiations through the Advisory Council for the NAFTA Negotiations. Having been founded in September 1990, following the recommendation of the Mexican Senate, the Advisory Council had business representatives (including the COECE itself) among its members, covering sectorial associations and trade chambers (Torres 2001: 137; Witker and Hernández 2008: 418) .
Apart from representatives from the sectors invited to the CANCI, the Council included the participation of representatives of large companies. Alba and Vega (2002: 65) report that labour unions were represented by the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), both of which emerged during the corporatist rule of the PRI, then holding the presidency (Natal and González 2003: 854) .
Agriculture, in turn, expressed its voice through the National Confederation of Smallholders (CNPP). As was the case with the CTM and the CNC, the CNPP had been controlled by the PRI for years, suggesting that the government opened itself only to inputs from non-state actors that, for sure, would not contradict the pace of liberalisation the national authorities had set (Natal and González 2003: 854 ). Such activism emerged amid the pursuit of more autonomy in politics vis-à-vis the old corporatist system (Natal and González 2003: 858) . Nevertheless, evidence suggests that unions did not strongly oppose negotiations after the establishment of the NAFTA, as it is the case of the FTAA talks (Natal and González 2003: 863) . One would not be exaggerating by saying that scepticism from labour, CSOs, and OSMs stemmed from the lack of transparency of NAFTA and the negotiation of other foreign trade deals. Alba and Vega (2002: 68-69) contend that, in the discussions between Mexican negotiators and their American and Canadian counterparts, the government thought that information on the state of negotiations should be diffused in a limited and cautious manner, being made transparent only once a deal had been reached.
Thus, without influencing decision-making at the national level, little wonder that CSOs and social movements placed their efforts in activism at the transnational level.
According to Saguier (2011: 189) 
